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Fiscal, Monetary, and Reserve Requirement Policy 






A simple endogenous growth model is developed in a framework where informational 
imperfections in financial markets give rise to adverse selection as well as costly state verification 
problems and the government needs to intervene financial markets to monetize its deficits. In the 
model, adverse selection problem raises credit rationing and financial intermediaries arise 
endogenously due to costly state verification. Inflation is shown to influence the amount of credit 
rationing and economic growth. We then examine the effects of government fiscal and monetary 
policies on equilibrium inflation, the amount of credit rationing, and thus economic growth. 
Results show that multiple equilibria arise when the share of government deficits is relatively 
large. We also illustrate how the use of reserve requirement policy can eliminate high inflation 
equilibrium and enable the government to reduce the inflation rate. In sum, it is found that Tobin 
effect hold when there is no reserve requirement or it is not binding. However, if the reserve 
requirement is set too high, such a policy will raise the equilibrium inflation rate and reduce 





It is widely believed that informational imperfections in financial markets create 
problems in transferring funds from lenders to borrowers. Spurred by the development of 
endogenous growth model, recent studies (as in Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and Bose and 
Cothren (1996)) have further recognized that informational problems in financial markets 
impede the accumulation of capital and thus economic growth. On the other hand, recent 
empirical research (as in Boyd et al. (1996) and English (1999)) has documented that 
inflation affects significantly the operations of financial markets. Furthermore, beginning 
with the pioneering work of Tobin (1965), much effort has been devoted to examining the 
relationship between inflation and economic growth. These works have also induced 
economists to consider the effects of government policies on the relationship between 
inflation and economic growth (as in Bhattacharya et al. (1997) and Fung et al. (1999)). 
Though each aforementioned problem has aroused much discussion, little attention has 
been paid to integrate these problems and demonstrate how government polices affect 
informational problems and thus the operations of financial markets. This is true although 
government policies influence to a large extent the efficiency of resource allocation 
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performed by financial markets (see Fry (1995)). This paper aims to extend the recent 
literature by integrating the above problems. This extension is important particularly to the 
less developed countries (LDCs) since informational problems are more severe in LDCs
1 
and government of LDCs usually face large deficits and thus need to intervene the financial 
markets to monetize deficits. 
To this end, we construct a model in which adverse selection and costly state 
verification problems coexist (as in Boyd and Smith (1993)) in a framework where the 
government finances large deficits by issuing money and bonds. The adverse selection 
problem gives rise to credit rationing and financial intermediaries arises endogenously due to 
costly state verification problem. In the model, an increase in the rate of return from holding 
money will raise the opportunity cost of financial intermediaries in lending to borrowers. 
This will raise the amount of credit rationing and thus reduce  the amount of resources 
channeled to capital investment. We then examine  how government financing policies 
influence the equilibrium inflation rate,  operations of financial intermediation, and thus 
economic growth.  Moreover, the existence of financial intermediaries also allows us to 
consider the effects of one commonly encountered regulation policy on financial institutions: 
the reserve requirement. 
We first examine the case where there is no financial regulation. Results show that if 
the share of government deficits is relatively large, multiple equilibria arise, of which one is 
characterized with a relatively high inflation rate and the other with a low inflation rate. In 
this case, effects of an increase in government deficits on the equilibrium inflation rate and 
economic growth depend crucially on the initial equilibrium. Specifically, an increase in 
government spending will increase inflation rate if the initial equilibrium inflation rate is low. 
Since money is an alternative choice of intermediaries’ portfolio (as in Tobin’s model), an 
increase in the inflation rate will lower the return from holding money and thus financial 
intermediaries will adjust their portfolio by holding less money. As shown in the model, this 
will alleviate adverse selection problems and increase the amount of resources allocated to 
capital investment, thus increasing the rate of economic growth. On the other hand, if the 
initial inflation rate is high, an increase in government spending share will lower the inflation 
rate and economic growth. Consequently, regardless of high- or low-inflation equilibrium, 
Tobin effect holds when there is no financial regulation. Moreover, an open market operation 
in which the government reduces the bonds to money ratio has no  real effect on the 
equilibrium if there is no reserve requirement or if it is not binding. 
We also conclude that if there are no financial market imperfections,  multiple 
equilibria vanish. This result is consistent with the belief (see Benhabib and Farmer (1999) 
for a survey) that asymmetric information in  financial markets is one of the  sources in 
obtaining indeterminate  equilibria. Moreover, it is often argued (see Bhattacharya  et al. 
(1997)) that government regulations in financial markets may be able to eliminate unwanted 
equilibrium and therefore solve for the problem of indeterminacy. To explore this issue in 
this framework, we then impose an arbitrary reserve  requirement and examine how the 
equilibrium consequences change.  It is  found that a moderate level of the reserve 
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requirement will not bind but it can eliminate the high inflation equilibrium. If the level of 
the reserve requirement is large, it becomes fully binding. In this case, such imposition will 
generally reduce the inflation rate and economic growth. Nonetheless, this does not imply 
that the government can always reduce equilibrium inflation rate by increasing the required 
reserve-deposit ratio.  In fact, if the required reserve-deposit ratio is set too large, the 
imposition of this reserve requirement will raise the inflation  rate and reduce economic 
growth. In other words, Tobin effect does not hold when the reserve requirement is set too 
high.  We obtain this  critical ratio of reserve requirement. Moreover, an open market 
operation  in which the government reduces the debts to money ratio will increase the 
equilibrium inflation rate and economic growth under binding reserve requirement. Finally, 
an increase in the government deficits under a binding reserve requirement will increase the 
equilibrium inflation rate and economic growth. 
A number of studies related to this paper are as follows. Azariadis and Smith (1996) 
present a model with a structure of informational imperfections different from that described 
in this paper. They then show that inflation exacerbates informational imperfections and may 
reduce economic growth.  However, due to their simple structure in modeling government 
behaviors, the roles played by government policies cannot be examined. Bhattacharya et al. 
(1997), on the other hand, examine government policies in a   neoclassical growth model 
where financial intermediaries arise solely to  provide liquidity service. Informational 
problems are missing in their framework, however. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the basic model and 
Section III determines the equilibrium contract that intermediaries offer to capital borrowers. 
Section IV characterizes the equilibrium consequences without government regulations on 
financial intermediation. In Section V, we consider the effects of government regulations - 




Consider a model economy populated with two-period-lived agents. Each generation 
has the same size and composition. For the sake of convenience, the population of each 
generation is normalized to one, of which a fraction  a of agents are lenders and the rest 
( a - 1 ) are borrowers. 
 
1. Behaviors of Agents 
 
Each young lender at  t  is endowed with one unit of labor in the first period of life 
and wishes to consume in their last period of life. A young lender at time  t  will sell his 
labor to firms and earn the ruling wage rate  t w . Then, each lender can save this wage for 
consumption in the next  period by directly holding money and government bonds, by 
directly lending to borrowers, or by making deposits into a financial intermediary. Ultimately, 
we will focus on the case where all savings are intermediated;  that is, lenders will not 
directly hold money and government bonds or directly lend to borrowers. Conditions for this 
will be described later. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Each young borrower is endowed with a risky investment project that, with a  
non-negative probability, can successfully convert time  t  output into time  1 + t  capital 
with inputs. Borrowers are not endowed with any other  resources at any date; thus to 
implement his project, a borrower has to seek external funding. Financial market frictions 
arise from asymmetric information which is derived by the following two assumptions. First, 
there are two types of borrowers and only a borrower knows his type. With probability 
i p , l h i , = , the investment project operated by a Type  i   borrower can convert  z   units of 
time  t  consumption good into  Qz  units of time  1 + t  capital. With probability  i p - 1 , 
the project fails and produces nothing. Assuming that  0 1 ‡ > ‡ h l p p , Type  l   borrowers 
are low-risk. A fraction  l of borrowers is Type  h . This assumption, as in Bencivenga and 
Smith (1993), raises an  issue of distinguishing Type  l  borrowers from Type  h  ones 
(known as adverse selection problem). 
The second assumption is that a project’s outcome can be observed at zero cost only 
by the borrower who operates the project. To learn the true outcome of the project, any other 
agent has to monitor the borrower. Monitoring is costly as it incurs  d units of consumption 
good per unit input of the project. As in Williamson (1986) and Boyd and Smith (1993), this 
creates incentives for a borrower to claim bankruptcy, independent of the true outcome of his 
project. It is also well known that the optimal contract in this content is a standard debt 
contract in which monitoring takes place when the borrower claims bankruptcy.
2 
Note that borrowers’ capital technology is a linear one;
3 thus, a maximal scale is 
needed to bound the size of loan. As discussed by Bencivenga and Smith (1993, hereafter 
B-S), this maximal scale has to tie the economy’s current capital stock. Similar to B-S, I 
assume that this maximal scale at  t  is equal to the current real wage rate  t xw ,  1 > x .
4  In 
other words, a borrower can implement his investment project at the scale less than or equal 
to  t xw ; nonetheless, every borrower will want to implement his project at the maximal scale 
given the linear technology of the project. 
The capital stock produced between time  1 - t  and  t  is available for producing 
output in time  t . We assume that each borrower becomes a firm operator regardless of his 
project’s outcome in the second period of life. An old borrower is able to produce output by 
renting capital (in positive or negative amounts) and hiring labors (including all young 
 
2. For simplicity, only non-stochastic monitoring is allowed. Moreover, the outcome of borrowers’ projects has a 
two-state distribution. As pointed out by Boyd and Smith (1993), the latter assumption makes the debt contract 
the optimal contract. 
3.  We may assume a capital production technology with decreasing returns to  scale and allow the borrower to 
choose the size of loans (see Ho (1996) for the example). However, as in Bencivenga and Smith (1993) this paper 
focuses on adverse selection problems in which the amount of credit rationing is defined by the number of loans 
made to the borrower (not the size). Thus, this assumption is maintained. See Bencivenga and Smith (1993) for 
discussion. 
4. The assumption of  1 > x  implies that it needs more one lender to finance a borrower. As in Diamond (1984), 
this will give rise to financial intermediary under costly state verification problem. See below. HUNG: FISCAL, MONETARY, AND RESERVE REQUIREMENT POLICY 
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lenders) at the competitively determined rental rates. The production function of output is 
given as 
 
s s h F
- =
1
t t t t N k y ,                                                       (1) 
 
where  t k   and  t N  are the amount of capital and labor employed by each firm respectively; 
and  t F  is the average per firm capital stock. Capital depreciates fully after production. In 
equilibrium, each firm will employ the same amount of capital; thus,  t t k = F . Furthermore, 
for simplicity  s h - =1 . Labor and capital markets are competitive so that the rental rates of 
labor ( t w ) and capital ( t r ) at time  t  are given as 
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2. Financial Intermediation 
 
The existence of financial intermediation in this model is justified by the  role of 
delegated monitoring as in Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986). Recall that the amount 
of savings by each young lender is equal to  t w ,  whereas each borrower is intended to 
borrow the amount of  t xw  with  1 > x . Consequently, it needs more than one lender to 
finance a project. Given the nature of the standard debt contract, this implies that more than 
one lender have to monitor a borrower if the borrower claims bankruptcy. As in Diamond 
(1984), the presence of financial intermediation can economize on the costs of monitoring 
the borrower.
5 Competitive behaviors in financial intermediation  are ensured by the 
assumption that any lender can establish an intermediary (or, in short, a bank) at no cost (free 
entry). Given this, each bank earns zero profit from its operation. In a stationary monetary 
equilibrium  in which money and government bonds are willingly held, the return from 
holding money has to be equal to that from government bonds. Furthermore,  to attract 
deposits, each bank has to offer a depositor with a safe return at least equal to the returns 
from holding money and government bonds. Though lending to borrowers is risky, each 
bank has the ability to exploit the law large numbers so to offer its depositors a safe return on 
risky loans. Consequently, if each bank can offer its depositors with a safe return that is at 
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least equal to the return from money, direct lending to borrowers can be precluded and all 




According to Bhattacharya et al. (1999), the government at time  t  has per  lender 
expenditure equal to  t w q , where  q  is a constant  and  t w  is the wage rate. The 
government can finance its expenditure by issuing money and/or bonds. Denoting the time 
t  per lender supply of  bonds by  t B   and per lender supply of money by  t M , the 
government budget constraint at  t  is given as 
 
t t t t t t t P B I B M M w / ] [ 1 1 1 - - - - + - = q                                         (4) 
 
where  t P  is the price level at time  t , and  1 - t I   is the gross real rate of interest on 
government bonds. Assuming that the government wishes to keep a constant debt to money 







                                                            (5) 
 






















m m w q ,                                      (6) 
 
where  t m  is the real balances, and  t b  is the real bond (per lender) holding at time  t . As 
stated, government bonds and money have the same rate of returns so that  1 = t I . Moreover, 
(5) implies that  t t m b b = ,  1 ‡ t . Denote the rate of return from holding money (the inverse 
of the inflation rate) between time  1 - t  and  t  as 
m








-1 ). Then (6) can 
be rewritten as 
 




t t t t m R m R m m w b b b q .                       ( 7) 
 
To complete the description of the model, the government issues  0 M   of money and 
0 B  of bonds (per  lender) at the initial period. Moreover, each initial old borrowers who 
operates firm is endowed with  0 k  units of capital. 
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III. Equilibrium Contracts 
 
Since direct lending is precluded, each borrower has to contact with a bank for ex ternal 
funding. However, lending to borrowers is subject to adverse selection and costly state 
verification problems. As in Bencivenga and Smith (1993), to solve the first problem, each 
bank can design contracts to induce a self-selection and separate borrowers according to their 
type. Therefore, although the debt contract is an optimal contract in this  framework, the 
terms of contracts (including the loan rate, loan quantity, and other conditions) are subject to 
the adverse selection problem. We now turn to determine the terms of the optimal contracts 
in financial market equilibrium. 
Before proceeding, note that, to induce self-selection, one needs a   situation that 
different types of borrowers have different opportunity cost being rejected with loans. To this 
end, I follow Bose and Cothren (1997)  by assuming that the project of young Type  l  
borrowers at time  t can be  utilized for home production without input at time  1 + t . 
Nonetheless, the project of Type  h  entrepreneurs has no such access. A project, if being 
implemented for capital production in  t , cannot be utilized for home production in  1 + t . 
To allow for balanced growth, we assume that the amount of home production produced at 
time  1 + t  is proportional to the wage rate at  the previous period; that is,  t vw  with  v  
being sufficiently small to  ensure that borrowing is desirable. Given this, a Type  l  
borrower will have no incentives to be considered as a Type  h  one. 
The financial markets are operated in a way similar to that of B-S. In each period, after 
receiving deposits from lenders each bank announces a set of contracts to borrowers. The 
terms of equilibrium contracts at time  t   are defined such that there is no incentive for any 
bank to offer alternative contracts, taking  1 + t r , the inflation rate, and other banks’ offers as 
given. 







t R q , , p }, where  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛
i
t p   is the probability with which a bank offers the loan, 
i
t q  is the 
quantity of loan offered, and 
i
t R  is the loan rate the borrower has to pay when his project 
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To prevent a Type h borrower from pretending as a Type l one or vice verse, the 
contract terms have to satisfy self-selection constraints given as 
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for all  t . 
The terms of the optimal contract is determined by the followings. First, competition 
will force banks to earn zero profit. Let 
i
t R  be the  interest rate charged to a Type  i  
borrower between time  t  and  1 + t  by a   bank. Then, if self-selection constraints are 
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Second, as stated a borrower will want to implement his project at the maximal scale 




t xw q q = = . Third,  to ensure that borrowing is desirable, we assume that 
h
t t R Q > +1 r .
7 Furthermore, v is assumed to be sufficiently small (smaller than (
l
t t R Q - +1 r )) 
so that the expected returns for Type h and l borrowers are increasing with 
h
t p  and 
l
t p  
respectively (see (8) and (9)). Note that  competition also implies that a bank offers the 
contract under which the expected return of the borrower is maximized. Given this, (10) 
should hold as equality, so 
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t R R < ; thus  1 ) ( <
m
t R f . Using this result, one can easily 
verify that the self-selection of (11) is also satisfied. 
 
IV. Equilibrium Analysis of Balanced Growth Path 
 
Recall that the expected payoff of a Type i borrower is an increasing function of 
i
t p . 
Thus, if there is no reserve requirement (or,  it is not binding), the bank can maximize 
borrowers’ expected payoff by setting that  1 =
h
t p , and thus 
 
 
6. d ) 1 ( i
i
t i p R p - -  is the rate of return from lending to a Type i borrower and  m
t R  is the deposit rate. 
7. Borrowing is desirable if the expected payoff is non-negative. This requires that  h




t R R < . Thus, if  h
t t R Q > +1 r ,  1 + t Qr  is automatically greater than  l
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It can be shown that  0 / < ¶ ¶
m
t
l R p . Therefore, an increase in the inflation rate will 
alleviate adverse problems and increase the probability  of getting loans for Type  l  
borrowers. Recall that the value of 
l
t p  lies between 0 and 1. Given this, the value of 
m
t R  
has an upper bound (denoted as 
m R ) given as  d r ) 1 ( h h p Q p - - . Also, it is obvious that the 
lower bound of 
m
t R (denoted as 
m R ) is zero and in this case the value of 
l
t p  (denoted as 
l p ) is maximized and given as 
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To further simplify the ensuing analysis, we assume that  1 =
l p .
8 In other words, 
1 =
l
t p  if  0 =
m R  and  0 =
l
t p   if  d r ) 1 ( h h
m m p Q p R R - - = = .  Given the terms  of 
equilibrium contracts, one sees that the total amount of resources used by borrowers for 
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Since each old borrower operates a firm, the number of firms is ( a - 1 ). Therefore, the 
per firm capital stock at time  1 + t  is given as 
 
Q xw p p k t
l
t l h t ] ) 1 ( [ 1 p l l - + = + .                                           (16) 
 
Given that all primary asset holdings are intermediated, the condition under which 
money and bond markets clear is given as 
 
a
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It is assumed that the  a is sufficiently large so that  t t b m +  is non-negative.
9 Using 
(5), we can rewrite (17) as 
 
 
8. That is,  ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( ( 1 1 d r d r l t l h h t h l p Q p p p Q p p - - = - - + + . 
9.  Note that when  0 = m
t R , 1 =
l p .  Thus, to ensure that  t t b m +  is non-negative for any given level of  m
t R , 
( )x x a l l a a - = - + - ‡ 1 )] 1 ( )[ 1 ( . Since  1 > x ,  this implies that  5 . 0 > a .  Note that, if  x ) 1 ( a a - = , 
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We next define a balanced-growth equilibrium as follows. 
 
Definition: Given  0 M ,  0 B , and  0 k , a  balanced-growth equilibrium comprises a set of 




t t t t t t t R R w P B M k r  and 
i
t p },  1 ‡ t , satisfying (2), (3), (7), 
(13), and (14). In addition, along with a balanced growth path,  t t t t t B M w k y   ,   ,   ,   ,  and  t P  
all grow at constant rates, whereas 
m
t t R , r  and 
i
t p  remain unchanged. 
 
1. Characterizations of Balanced Growth Equilibria 
 




s p l l s








t ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ) (
1 .                         ( 19) 
 
From (1) and (2),  g  is also the growth rate of output. Recall that  0 / < ¶ ¶
m
t
l R p , 
implying that a decrease in 
m R  (an increase in the inflation rate) will reduce the amount of 
credit rationing and therefore raise the growth rate. However, this does not imply that infinite 
inflation leads to an infinite economic growth rate. To see this, recall that  1 = =
l l
t p p   when 
the inflation rate is infinite (that is, when  0 =
m R ). Then, the growth rate under an infinite 
inflation rate is equal to 
s l l s
- - + - xN p p Q l h ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( , which obviously is not infinite. 
Note from (19) that, under a balanced growth path where 
l p  remains unchanged,  t m  
is growing at the same rate as the output so that  1 - = t t gm m . Therefore, the government 
budget constraint can be rewritten as 
 
) ( ) 1 ( 1
m
t t R g m w - + = - b q                                               (20) 
 
Note that  1 ) 1 ( - + t m b   can be viewed as the inflation tax base and  ) (
m R g -  is the 
inflation tax rate. With (18) and (19) and after some manipulations, (20) becomes 
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10. For brevity, time subscripts are suppressed in the parameters that remain unchanged along the balanced growth 
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where
s p l l s
- - + - = xN p p Q g
l
t l h ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( . It is clear that the (21) determines the equilibrium 
value of 
m R .  Once 
m R  is derived, other variables (such as 
l p ,  m ,  and  g ) can be 
obtained by substituting the equilibrium level of 
m R  into Equations ( 4 1 ¢ ), (18), and (19). 
To  obtain the equilibrium 
m R , denote the left-hand side of (21) as  ) (
m R y and the 
right-hand side as  ) (
m R W . Then the equilibrium   levels of 
m R  can be determined by y 
and  W .  Note that  ) (
m R W  is the inflation tax base which is derived by subtracting the 
resources allocated to capital borrowers from total amount of deposits. To characterize the 
equilibrium, we first observe that  ) (
m R y  and  ) (
m R W   have the following properties (see 
Appendix for the proof). 
 
Lemma 1: (a) 0 ) ( > ¢
m R y ; (b) 0 ) ( > ¢ ¢
m R y ; (c) 0 ) ( > ¢
m R W ; (d) 0 ) ( > ¢ ¢
m R W . 
 
From Lemma 1, both  ) (
m R y  and  ) (
m R W  are strictly convex functions. Therefore, 
the equilibrium consequence will depend on the  values of  ) (
m R y  and  ) (
m R W  when 
0 =
m R  and 
m m R R = , where 
m R  is the upper bound of 
m R . Specifically, a unique 
equilibrium exists if the relations of  ) 0 ( ) ( ) 0 ( W y < >  and  ) ( ) ( ) (
m m R R W y > <  are 
simultaneously held. On the other hand, multiple equilibria could arise if  ) 0 ( ) ( ) 0 ( W y < >  
and  ) ( ) ( ) (
m m R R W y < > . From (21), it is obvious that the government spending share,  q, 
plays an important role in determining the relationships between  ) 0 ( y  and  ) 0 ( W   and 
between  ) (
m R y  and  ) (
m R W . We next specify the conditions under which the unique and 
multiple equilibria arise. 
To begin with, we define a 
*
1 q  such that  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( W y =  if 
* = 1 q q   and a 
*
2 q   such 
that  ) (
m R y = ) (
m R W  if 










,  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( W y > , if 
* > 1 q q  and 
) (
m R y > ) (
m R W  if 
* > 2 q q .  Then we have the following lemma determining  the 
relationship between 
*
2 q   and 
*
1 q . 
 
Lemma 2: If  d is relatively large, then 
* * > 1 2 q q . 
 
Note that  d can be viewed as the level of financial development.
11  As LDCs possess 
relatively less developed financial system, we will focus on the case where  d is relatively 
large so that 
* * > 1 2 q q . Given this, depending on the share of government deficits, we have 
the following three possibilities to consider: Case 1. 
* * > > 1 2 q q q , Case 2. 
* * > > 1 2 q q q , and 
Case 3.  q q q > >
* *
1 2 .  The first  case is characterized with a relatively higher share of 
government deficits and, according to the definitions of 
*
1 q  and 
*
2 q , both the relations of 
 
11. See Di Giorgio (1999). JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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) (
m R y > ) (
m R W  and  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( W y >  are held. Given the convexity of  ) (
m R y  and  ) (
m R W , 
this implies that there are either multiple equilibria or none in Case 1. The locus of  y in 
Case 1 is labeled as  1 y  in Figure 1. As  seen in the figure, the key factor ensuring the 
existence of two equilibria is that the slope of  ) (
m R y  is sufficiently flat for a given locus of 
) (
m R W .  Given the functions of  ) (
m R y  and  ) (
m R W , this requires that q should not be 
too large (of course,  q still has to be greater than 
*
2 q ).
12  As a consequence, a relatively 
large amount of government deficits may give rise to multiple equilibria of which one is 
characterized with a high inflation rate (denoted as high-inflation equilibrium and labeled as 
‘H’ in Figure 1) and the other is with a low inflation rate (low-inflation equilibrium, labeled 
as ‘L’. For future reference, we denote 
m
L R ) (
m
H R  as the rate of return from holding money 
in the low-inflation (high-inflation) equilibrium. Note that  0 / < ¶ ¶
m l R p ; this implies that 
more Type l borrowers are credit rationed in low-inflation equilibrium than in high-inflation 
equilibrium. As Type l borrowers are more efficient in producing capital, the growth rate is 
lower in low-inflation equilibrium than in high-inflation equilibrium. This further implies 
that the inflation tax rate (given as 
m R g - ) is higher in high-inflation equilibrium than in 
low-inflation equilibrium. On the other hand, the inflation tax base, given as  t m , is higher in 
low-inflation equilibrium than in high-inflation equilibrium   (see (18)). To finance a given 
government deficit, it can be either a higher inflation tax rate with a lower inflation tax base 
(high-inflation  equilibrium) or a lower inflation tax rate with a higher inflation tax base 



















Figure 1  The Unique and Multiple Equilibria 
 
12. If 
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Note that the equilibrium levels of 
m R  are obtained from government  budget 
constraint specified in (21). This implies that each bank and borrower will take 
m R  as given. 
As a consequence, individual agent  and financial intermediaries fail to pick high- or 
low-inflation equilibrium, although lenders may prefer the higher levels of 
m R  over the 
lower levels of 
m R . On the other hand, the government can impose a regulatory policy on 
the operations of financial intermediaries and eliminate the unwanted equilibrium. We will 
discuss this issue in the next section. 
We now turn to the next case where 
* * > > 1 2 q q q .  Obviously, both relations of 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( W y >  and  ) ( ) (
m m R R W y < hold. This guarantees the existence of unique balanced 
growth equilibrium. The configuration of  y in this case is depicted as  2 y  in Figure 1 and 
the unique equilibrium is labeled as ‘ U’. Finally, if  q q q > >
* *
1 2 ,  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( W y <   and 
) ( ) (
m m R R W y < . Note that the slope of  y is positively correlated with  q. Therefore, if 
multiple equilibria arise in Case 1, there must be no equilibrium in Case 3 since the slope of 
y (labeled  3 y  in Figure 1) is too flat. The following proposition summarizes the existence 
of equilibrium. 
 
Proposition  1:  Suppose that  d is relatively large. Then if 
* * > > 1 2 q q q , there are two 
equilibria, provided that  q is not too large. If 
* * > > 1 2 q q q , there exists a unique balanced 
growth equilibrium. Finally, if  q q q > >
* *
1 2 , there is no equilibrium. 
 
For the rest of the paper, we consider only the case where the government spending 
share is relatively large and multiple equilibria always arise.
13  This case raises an interesting 
issue of how the government regulation policy can eliminate the unwanted equilibrium and 
solve the problem of indeterminacy. We will discuss this issue in the next section. 
 
2. Comparative Statics 
 
In this subsection, we examine the effects of changing government policy on  the 
inflation and economic growth rates when multiple equilibria arise. As the first policy, an 
open market operation in which the government reduces the bonds to money ratio for a given 
level of expenditure will have no effect on the economy’s equilibrium, a standard result in 
overlapping generations models where money is not dominated in the rate of return. This can 
be derived by observing that  b , government debt to money ratio, does not appear in (21). 
We next discuss the result of an increase in government spending share. When q 
increases,  y shifts up while  W   remains unchanged. It can be inferred from Figure 1 that 
the effects of an increase in q on the inflation rate and economic growth depend on the 
initial equilibrium. Specifically, if the initial equilibrium is the high-inflation equilibrium, an 
increase in  q will lower the inflation rate and thus economic growth. On the other hand, 
 
13.  In fact, the characterizations of the unique equilibrium (in the case where 
* * > > 1 2 q q q )  is the same as the 
high-inflation equilibrium as can be inferred from Figure 1. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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such increase will raise inflation and economic growth for the low-inflation equilibrium. 
These results may account for recent empirical findings by Bruno and Easterly (1998) who 
find that the initial rates of inflation play an important role in determining the relationship 




We have shown so far that multiple equilibria may arise in this framework. This result 
in a sense is consistent with many theoretical models;
14  nevertheless, the existence of 
multiple equilibria in this framework  hinges  on the existence of financial market 
imperfections.
15  To  illustrate this, suppose that the information regarding entrepreneurs’ 
type is public. In this situation, the loan rate given in (13) still holds. However, competition 
among banks implies that  1 = =
l h p p . In  other words, credit rationing disappears under 
public information. In this case, (21) becomes 
 
a









                                               (22) 
 
Note that both  m  and the growth rate (g) are independent of 
m R  when information 
is public. Clearly,  y is an increasing function of 
m R  while  W  is independent of 
m R . 
Therefore, a unique equilibrium exists if there is any equilibrium. 
 
V. Government Regulations on Financial Intermediation: the Reserve Requirement 
 
Section IV has demonstrated that financial market imperfections may give rise  to 
indeterminacy of equilibrium. Economists such as Simons (1948) and  Friedman (1960) 
argued that the source of indeterminacy is the free and unregulated financial markets.
16 This 
argument implies that government regulation on financial markets may be able to solve the 
problems of indeterminacy. Indeed, each individual will take the rate of return from money 
m R  as given. Then, as shown previously, either a relatively high inflation rate or a relatively 
low inflation rate can finance an exogenously given q. This indeterminacy may be solved if 
we consider the effects of government regulations on financial markets. 
Financial regulations are widespread in developing countries. Many studies (as in 
Nichols (1974) and Bryant and Wallace (1984)) have suggested that government regulations 
such as reserve requirement is necessary to enhance the efficiency of using the inflation tax, 
especially for the countries who need to monetize deficits. In this framework, inflation has 
two opposite effects on the ground of welfare for each generation: An increase in the 
 
14. See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for a comprehensive discussion. 
15. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
16. See Azariadis and Smith (1998) for a discussion on this point. HUNG: FISCAL, MONETARY, AND RESERVE REQUIREMENT POLICY 
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inflation rate will lower the payoff of lenders as the deposit rate (given as 
m
t R ) is equal to the 
inverse of the inflation rate, but it can  raise the expected payoff of borrowers.
17  In 
consideration of all generations, an increase in the inflation rate has an additional effect: It 
increases the growth rate of income and thus the welfare. However, the following lemma 




Lemma 3: If  Q  is relatively small and the welfare of lenders  carries a relatively higher 
weight in the social welfare, then the government may prefer low-inflation equilibrium to the 
high-inflation one. 
 
Intuitively, the magnitude of the effects of an increase in the inflation  rate on the 
growth rate depends on the parameter  Q (see Equation (19)). The  assumption that Q is 
relatively small implies that the effect of an  increase in inflation on the growth rate is 
sufficiently small and hence may be overwhelmed by the negative effect of the inflation rate 
on the welfare of lenders. Furthermore, it is assumed that the fraction of lenders,  a, is 
sufficiently large (greater than 0.5).
19 Thus, the welfare of lenders carries a higher weight in 
the social welfare function.
20 These results implies that a lower inflation may be preferred by 
the government as it can maximize the welfare of lenders, which is the major concern of the 
government. We then show that a moderate level of  reserve requirement allows the 
government to eliminate the high-inflation equilibrium and enables the government to reduce 
the inflation rate. Nevertheless, this result does not imply that the government can always 
raise the required reserve-deposit ratio and lower the inflation rate. In  fact, if the required 
ratio is set too high, inflation will increase and such an increase reduces economic growth. In 
other words, Tobin effect does not hold if the reserve requirement is set too high. We now 
proceed with our analysis. 
Denote 
t g  as the reserve-deposit ratio in time  t . Note that  ) (
m h l R f p p =  from (14). 
From this result, it is clear  that  )] 1 ( /[ ))] ( ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( [ b a f l l p a a + - + - - = t
m h
t w R x m  and 
the reserve-deposit ratio becomes 
 
17. The loan rate is negatively correlated with the inflation rate. See Equation (13). 
18. Owing to the length of this paper, we do not explore issues of the optimal inflation rate and thus optimal reserve 
requirements from the welfare aspect. In general, the effects of government regulations in financial markets on 
social welfare are ambiguous as the welfare of lenders and borrowers are conflicting. In this case, the closed 
form solution is not attainable and, to pursue the optimal reserve requirements, one has to resort to numerical 
experiments. To avoid this ambiguity and simplify our analysis, we simply state the conditions under which the 
government may prefer the low-inflation equilibrium to the high-inflation one. Then, we demonstrate how the 
imposition of reserve requirement enables the government to achieve this goal. 
19. See footnote 9. 
20. Indeed, in majority voting equilibrium the government will make its decision based on the majority’s interests. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that only the lenders need to hold money and government bonds, through which 
the government collect the revenue for its deficits. This may give another  reason to why the government may 
make its decision based on lenders’ interest. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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( ) b a
f l l p a a
g
+
- + - -
= =
1






t ,                             (23) 
 
Let  g  be an arbitrary required ratio of reserve to deposit imposed by the government; 
thus  g g ‡ t  for all time. Recall that the optimal value of 
h p  is one and thus 
l p  is derived 
as in ( 4 1 ¢ ) if the reserve requirement is not binding. However, if it is binding, the bank will 
adjust the values of 
h p   to meet the requirement. To illustrate this, we derive the following 
equation for the case where the reserve requirement is binding (that is, where  t g g ‡ ): 
 
C x R
h m ” + - = - + - g a b a p f l l a ) 1 ( )] ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( ,                          (24) 
 
where C is a constant. Note that when the actual reserve to deposit ratio is just equal to the 
required (that is,  g g = t ), the optimal value of 
h p  is still equal to one. We let 
m Rg  denote 
the value of 
m R  derived from (24) when  1 =
h p . Since  0 / ) ( < ¶ ¶
m m R R f   from (24) 
m Rg  
is positively correlated with  g  and the reserve requirement binds if 
m R <
m Rg . Moreover, 
when 
m R <
m Rg ,  ) ( ) (
m m R R g f f < ; thus the value of 
h p  must be less than one for 
m R <
m Rg  
to satisfy (24). Consequently, if the reserve requirement is binding, 
h p  is less than one and 
is a function of 
m R  (denoted as 
h
R
m p   hereafter). 
 
1. Equilibrium Analysis in the Presence of Reserve Requirements 
 
With the imposition of a reserve requirement, the functions of  ) (
m R W   and  ) (
m R y  























f l l a a
W
  if                                                 ) 1 (
,   if          
)] ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 (


















, R   if                               
) 1 (



















y                            (26) 
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where  g   is derived from (19) and  g , the rate of economic growth under a binding reserve 
requirement, is given as   
 
s p f l l s






m )] ( ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ) (                         (27) 
 
In comparison with (19), (27) implies that 
h
R
m g g p =  for a given 
m R . Since 
h
R
m p  is 
less than one with a binding reserve requirement,  g g > . Consequently, for a given 
m R  the 
value of  ) (
m R y , the inflation rate tax base, is  greater in the case where the reserve 
requirement is binding, except when  0 =
m R  at which the value of  ) (
m R y  is the same no 
matter whether  the reserve requirement is binding or not. Moreover, when the reserve 
requirement is binding, 







)] ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 (
) 1 (
f l l a




= .                                       (28) 
 
Substituting (27) and (28) into (26), one can show that  0 ) ( > ¢
m R y  and  0 ) ( > ¢ ¢
m R y  
when the reserve requirement is binding. As a result, the locus defined by  ) (
m R y  with a 
reserve requirement (when the reserve requirement is binding and when it is not bonding) 
has the configuration as depicted in Figure 2. On the  other hand,  ) (
m R W  becomes a 
constant when the reserve requirement  is binding. Thus, when 
m m R R g < , the function of 
) (
m R W  has the configuration as depicted in Figure 2. Note that, in Figure 2,  y   and W  
are the loci of  y and  W respectively when the reserve requirement is binding. 
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Recall that 
m
H R  and 
m
L R  are the values of 
m R  at the  original high-inflation and 
low-inflation equilibrium, respectively. Therefore, we have three cases to consider regarding 
the required reserve-deposit ratio. The first case is characterized with a relatively low level of 





m R R R < < g . Obviously, the reserve requirement is not 
binding and has no effect. In the second case where levels of the reserve requirement are 




H R R R < < g , as depicted in Figure 2. As shown, the imposition of the 
reserve requirement will not bind; nevertheless, it eliminates the high-inflation equilibrium 
as shown in Figure 2. This result is consistent with that obtained by Bhattacharya et al. 
(1997). Consequently,  if the government prefers  the low-inflation equilibrium to the 
high-inflation one, a moderate level of reserve requirement is needed even though it is not 
binding. Finally, we consider the case where the level of reserve requirement is relatively 




H R R R g < < . Obviously, the reserve requirement becomes 
fully binding and the equilibrium is located at ‘B ’, as shown in Figure 3. From the figure, it 
can be inferred that the equilibrium inflation rate in a binding reserve requirement (denoted 
as 
m RB ) may be greater or less than 
m




B R R > ). Denoting 
L g  as the original growth rate in the low-inflation equilibrium, the 
condition that 
m
B R  is greater than 
m








H R R R
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L R . 
 
Proof: Denote  ) (
m R W  and  ) (
m R y  as  the functions of  ) (
m R W   and  ) (
m R y  




L R , ) (
m R W  (located at  O  in Figure 3)> ) (




L R R y W =  




























L R . Using the  definitions of  ) (
m
L R W ,  ) (
m
L R y ,  ) (
m
L R W   and  ) (
m




f l l a a
) 1 (















L L L ,                             (30) 
 
where  L g  is derived by substituting 
m
L R   into (19) and, similarly,  L g  is derived from (27). 
Using (28) to obtain  ( ) g a b + 1 , we can rewrite (30) as   
 










L g g R g g x R g g R m
L
m
L - + - - + - < - p p f l l a a .      (31) 
 
Note that  L
h
R L g g m




L p . The above equation can be simplified as 




L g x R R f l l a a - + - < 1 ) 1 ( .  Substituting  L
h
R L g g m




L p   derived from (28) 




B R R > , if  ( ) g a b a
a























.           Q.E.D.                                     (32) 
 
Note that the imposition of a binding reserve requirement will increase inflation tax 
base and reduce the amount of resource allocated to capital borrowers. This implies that to 
finance a constant share of  deficits the inflation tax rate (given as  ) (
m R g - ) should be 




L p  is a decreasing function of  g  




L p . Proposition 2 states that 
if  g  is set to be greater than 
* g , the growth rate decreases sharply so that the inflation tax JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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rate, 
m R g - , decreases even though 
m R  decreases (that is 
m
B R  is lower than 
m
L R ). On the 
other hand, if 
* g g < , the growth rate is not low enough. Thus, to lower the inflation tax rate, 
m
B R  has to be greater than 
m
L R . If the government intends to keep the inflation rate as low as 
possible, it is obvious that 
* g   is the optimal level of the reserve requirement. 
Note further that, according to Proposition 2, if 
* g g > , the imposition of a binding 
reserve requirement obviously reduces 
m R  and increases the equilibrium inflation rate. This 
will alleviate adverse selection problems as the probability of getting  loans increases for 
Type  l  borrowers (see ( 4 1 ¢ )). As Type  l  borrowers are more efficient, one may suspect 
that this binding  reserve requirement may raise economic growth.  Nonetheless, since 




B R R W W > , the total amount of resources allocated to capital borrowers is smaller in 
equilibrium  ‘B’ than in equilibrium  ‘L’ (the low-inflation equilibrium). In consideration of 
these two effects, it can be shown that the growth rate in this case (denoted as  B g ) is still 













R - = - = W W q .
21  As 




















B R R < . 
 
2. Comparative Statics 
 
We now consider the effects of changing government policy on equilibrium  inflation. 
Contrast to the previous analyses, an open market operation in  which the government 
reduces the bonds to money ratio has a real effect on the equilibrium under a binding reserve 
requirement. As can be seen from  (25) and (26), a decrease in  b  will shift the locus of 
) (
m R W   down while the locus defined by  ) (
m R y   remains unchanged. This will obviously 
decrease the equilibrium level of 
m R . With respect to economic growth, a decrease in  b , 
on the one hand, increase resources allocated to capital borrowers; and on the other hand, 
decrease 
m R  so that the probability of getting loans for Type  l   borrowers is increased. 
Thus, the growth rate is increasing with a decrease in 
m R . 
As before, an increase in q has no effect on  ) (
m R W  but  will shift the locus of 
) (
m R y  up. With a binding reserve requirement, we can infer from Figure 4 that an increase 
in  q will always reduce the equilibrium levels of 
m R  and thus increase  ) (
m R f .  This 
implies that an increase in  q under a binding  reserve requirement will increase the 
equilibrium inflation rate and economic growth. 
 
 
21. Comparing equilibrium ‘B’ and ‘L’ in Figure 4 can reveals this relation. HUNG: FISCAL, MONETARY, AND RESERVE REQUIREMENT POLICY 
  21 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the effects of government fiscal, monetary, and reserve 
requirement policy on the inflation rate and economic growth in an environment in which 
financial markets are characterized with adverse  selection and costly state verification 
problems and financial  intermediaries arise  endogenously as to provide the service of 
delegated monitoring. 
Results show that multiple equilibria arise if government deficits are relatively large. 
We also demonstrate that the key factor for the  existence of multiple equilibria is the 
existence of financial market  imperfections. When multiple equilibria arise, the initial 
condition plays  an important role in determining the effects of government policy on 
equilibrium inflation and economic growth. In this case, Tobin effect holds. Moreover, an 
arbitrary reserve requirement can eliminate the  high-inflation equilibrium and enable the 
government to reduce the inflation rate. However, if the reserve requirement is set too high, 
such a policy will raise the equilibrium inflation rate and reduce the economic growth. This 
result contradicts Tobin effect. Moreover, an open market operation in which the government 
reduces the bonds to money ratio will increase the equilibrium inflation rate and economic 
growth under a binding reserve requirement. When the reserve requirement is not binding, 
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